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CHAPTER 3
WHO BENEFITS FROM REDUCING
THE COST OF FORMALITY?
QUANTILE REGRESSION
DISCONTINUITY ANALYSIS
Tommaso Gabrieli, Antonio F. Galvao Jr.
and Gabriel V. Montes-Rojas
ABSTRACT
This paper AU :2studies the effect of increasing formality via tax reduction and
simpliﬁcation schemes on micro-ﬁrm performance. We develop a simple
theoretical model that yields two intuitive results. First, low- and high-
ability entrepreneurs are unlikely to be affected by a tax reduction and
therefore, the reduction has an impact only on a segment of the micro-ﬁrm
population. Second, the beneﬁts to such reduction, as measured by proﬁts
and revenues, are increasing in the entrepreneur’s ability. Then, we
estimate the effect of formality on the entire conditional distribution
(quantiles) of revenues using the 1996 Brazilian SIMPLES program and
a rich survey of formal and informal micro-ﬁrms. The econometric
approach compares eligible and non-eligible ﬁrms, born before and
after SIMPLES in a local interval about the introduction of SIMPLES.
We develop an estimator that combines both quantile regression and the
regression discontinuity design. The econometric results corroborate the
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positive effect of formality on micro-ﬁrms’ performance and produce a
clear characterization of who beneﬁts from these programs.
Keywords: Formality; micro-ﬁrms; quantile regression; regression
discontinuity
JEL classification: J23; L25
‘‘Lo que pasa es que aca´ si vos queres abrir un negocio te matan a papeles, y despue´s te
controlan, y los impuestos te revientan.’’ [What happens here is that when you try to open
a business they kill you on paperwork (red tape), then they control you, and taxes are
unbearable.] Martı´n Caparro´s, El Interior, a book on interviews and anecdotes from the
poor countryside in Argentina.
INTRODUCTION
Formality is broadly deﬁned as participation in societal and govern-
mental institutions, such as paying taxes, being registered with the
authorities, etc. (see Gerxhani, 2004; Maloney, 2004, for a survey). Firms’
inability to become formal is thought to have deleterious effects on
performance. As examples, formality offers the ﬁrm access to risk pooling
mechanisms that may attract more educated paid workers and engage
them in a longer relationship with the ﬁrm, which in turn makes training
and capital goods acquisition more proﬁtable; formality may be a
requirement for access to formal credit markets or government provided
business development services or as Paula and Scheinkman (2007, 2010)
have argued, for subcontracting relations with formal ﬁrms. Moreover,
to the extent that formality increases the ability of micro-entrepreneurs
to establish property rights over their investments and reduces the risk
of being ﬁned by government inspectors, it creates incentives for
operating out of ﬁxed locations rather than in an ambulatory fashion
(see de Soto, 1989).
The high costs of complying with government regulations and institutions
have often been seen as largely responsible for the presence of large informal
sectors in developing countries. The perceived onerous cost of formality
was tackled by several Latin American governments by introducing tax
reductions and simpliﬁcations. Examples of such programs are the Mono-
tributo1 in Argentina, SARE2 in Mexico, and the SIMPLES3 in Brazil.
Available evidence shows that these programs had a positive effect on
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formality. See Kaplan, Piedra, and Seira (2006) for SARE; andMonteiro and
Assunc- a˜o (2006) and Fajnzylber, Maloney, and Montes-Rojas (2011) for
SIMPLES.
We contribute to this literature by answering three questions: First, what
is the effect of formality on ﬁrm performance? Second, which ﬁrms beneﬁt
from tax reduction and simpliﬁcation schemes? Third, is there hetero-
geneity on the effect of formality on ﬁrm performance? These questions
have very important policy implications. In a Ricardian setting, tax
reductions imply a redistribution of wealth, and therefore, it is important
to quantify which ﬁrms are really beneﬁting from these programs. In
particular, if tax reductions only beneﬁt already well-off formal ﬁrms, then
the program did not accomplish the task of broadening the scope of
formality. We focus on the micro-ﬁrm sector, deﬁned as own-account
workers and ﬁrms with a maximum of ﬁve paid employees, that constitutes
the majority of ﬁrms in developing countries.4 Within this sector three
groups can be distinguished. First, high-ability entrepreneurs with
substantial growth prospects may have self-selected into formality with
the old (high) tax system, as the perceived beneﬁts of being formal offset
the cost of formality. Then, this segment beneﬁts only from the tax
reduction. Second, some micro-entrepreneurs are in the informal sector as
a subsistence strategy as predicted in the Harris and Todaro (1970) dual
labor market hypothesis (see Maloney, 1999, 2004; Mandelman & Montes-
Rojas, 2009, for a discussion). These are low-ability entrepreneurs and they
will not value future gains from becoming formal and, therefore, tax
reductions will not affect them. Third, in between those segments there are
micro-ﬁrms that may become formal only when the cost of formality is low
enough. These micro-ﬁrms receive the gains from being formal but have to
pay taxes as a result. We call this segment the target group and it
corresponds to medium-ability entrepreneurs. These are the ﬁrms that
should beneﬁt from the tax reduction programs and change their formality
status.
We begin our analysis by developing a theoretical model motivated by the
work of Rauch (1991) and Paula and Scheinkman (2007, 2010), with
emphasis on the effect of a reduction in taxes. This model yields two
intuitive results. First, low- and high-ability entrepreneurs are unlikely to be
affected by a tax reduction policy reform and therefore, the reform has an
impact only on a segment of the micro-ﬁrm population, deﬁned by default
as medium-ability entrepreneurs. Second, the beneﬁts of such reform, as
measured by proﬁts and revenues, are increasing in the entrepreneur’s
ability.
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Empirically, our goal is to quantify the impact of formality on the
conditional distribution (quantiles) of micro-ﬁrm’s revenues, and the size of
the target group (i.e., which ﬁrms beneﬁt from the tax reduction). Two
problems arise in our empirical setup. First, formality is endogenous, and in
particular, correlated with the unobserved entrepreneurial ability. Second,
we might not be able to identify the effect of formality for all ﬁrms.
To solve the ﬁrst problem, the identiﬁcation strategy makes use of the
SIMPLES program in Brazil, that offers an exogenous change in legislation
that can be used to control for self-selection and endogeneity. Thus, our
paper builds on the work of Monteiro and Assunc- a˜o (2006) and Fajnzylber
et al. (2011) by analyzing the SIMPLES program in Brazil that offers an
exogenous change in legislation that can be used to control for self-selection
and endogeneity. We use the same unique dataset for micro-ﬁrms, the
ECINF 1997. Moreover, following those authors we use a difference-in-
differences approach with the age of the ﬁrm and with ineligible ﬁrms as a
control group to identify the effect of formality on ﬁrm performance.
Monteiro and Assunc- a˜o (2006) study the effect of SIMPLES on having a
government issued license, which constitutes a necessary requirement for
further formalization (such as paying taxes of social security), and they ﬁnd
an increase in formal licensing among retail ﬁrms of 13 percentage points,
but no effect on eligible ﬁrms from other sectors (construction, manufactur-
ing, transportation, and other services). In addition, using SIMPLES as an
instrumental variable (IV) for formality, they show that the latter
signiﬁcantly increases access to credit, and alters the amount and
composition of investment toward larger and longer-term projects.
Fajnzylber et al. (2011) show that SIMPLES has only a local effect on
licensing rates for ﬁrms born just after the introduction of the program.
Using a regression discontinuity design (see Hahn, Todd, & van der
Klaauw, 2001; van der Klaauw, 2002, for a discussion about regression
discontinuity estimators), with weights given by time-in-business and its
distance to the introduction of SIMPLES, they ﬁnd a signiﬁcant effect on
licensing, tax registration, tax payments, and social security contributions.
When more ﬁrms were taken into consideration, the statistical signiﬁcance
of these effects decreases monotonically with the sample average time–
distance to the introduction of SIMPLES. We build on their analysis and
extend it to a quantile regression (QR) discontinuity analysis.
In order to address estimation of the distributional effects of formality, we
make use of the heterogeneity in the conditional distribution of revenue
applying QR techniques, which will prove an indispensable tool for the
problem in question. QR methods offer the advantage of describing not only
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averages of possible outcomes but also their entire distribution. Thus, QR
techniques provide a systematic method to analyze differences in covariates
effects (see Koenker, 2005; Koenker & Hallock, 2001), a framework for
robust estimation and inference, and most importantly allow exploring a
range of conditional quantiles exposing conditional heterogeneity. For the
present problem, the micro-ﬁrm heterogeneity given by unobserved
characteristics (entrepreneurial ability) can be analyzed along the single
dimensional conditional quantiles of the ﬁrm revenues. Along this
dimension, high quantiles correspond to high-ability entrepreneurs and low
quantiles to low-ability entrepreneurs. Chesher (2005) studies identiﬁcation
under discrete variation and shows that the identifying intervals can be
estimated using QR methods. Thus, as argued in Chesher (2005), the
identiﬁcation through QR strategy may work for some quantiles (in our case
target entrepreneurs) but not for others (in our case the low- and high-
ability entrepreneurs). We face a similar situation where the SIMPLES
program can be used for identiﬁcation only for medium-ability entrepre-
neurs but not for low- and high-ability ones.
Our proposed estimation strategy thus combines the regression disconti-
nuity approach and the QR framework. In this paper, we employ the linear
instrumental variables quantile regression (IVQR) estimator proposed by
Chernozhukov and Hansen (2006, 2008) applied to estimate a fuzzy
regression discontinuity design model. The model is semiparametric in the
sense that the functional form of the conditional distribution of the response
variable given the regressors is left unspeciﬁed. The use of IVQR in a
regression discontinuity design appeared in Guiteras (2008) motivated by an
empirical application to the returns to compulsory schooling, and Pereda-
Fernandez (2010) estimating the effects of class size on scholastic
achievement. Frolich and Melly (2008) propose a nonparametric identiﬁca-
tion of the quantile treatment effects in the regression discontinuity design
and they propose an uniformly consistent estimator for the potential
outcome distributions and for the function-valued effects of the policy.
Frandsen (2008) introduces a procedure to nonparametrically estimate local
quantile treatment effects in a regression discontinuity design with binary
treatment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second section develops
a theoretical model. The third section describes the ECINF micro-ﬁrm
survey. The fourth section describes the SIMPLES program and the
identiﬁcation strategy. The ﬁfth section develops the QR discontinuity
estimator. The sixth section presents the econometric results. The seventh
section concludes.
1
3
5
7
9
11
13
15
17
19
21
23
25
27
29
31
33
35
37
39
Quantile Regression Discontinuity Analysis 105
TAXES AND THE INFORMAL SECTOR
In this section, we present a simple model that generates a segmentation
characterized by salaried workers, informal and formal micro-entrepre-
neurs. The model shows that an individual becomes an informal
entrepreneur, rather than being a salaried worker, if her individual ability
is higher than a certain threshold, and becomes a formal entrepreneur,
rather than being an informal one, if her individual ability is higher than an
even higher threshold. The higher is the cost of formality the higher is the
threshold value of ability to become a formal entrepreneur. This simple
model builds on the models of Rauch (1991) and Paula and Scheinkman
(2007, 2010). The model will then be used to analyze the impact of
SIMPLES on formality.
We consider a continuum of agents, each denoted by i and characterized
by entrepreneurial ability yi, which is distributed according to a probability
density function g(  ). Agents choose between working for an existing ﬁrm
and earning a wage of w independent of their ability,5 thus becoming a
salaried worker, operating a ﬁrm in the informal sector or operating a ﬁrm
in the formal sector. The last two options correspond to the entrepreneurial
sector. An entrepreneur produces quantity yi of an homogeneous good using
capital ki and labor li as inputs. In order to maintain tractability we consider
a Cobb–Douglas technology yi ¼ yikai lbi , with a,bW0 and aþ bo1.6
We normalize the price of the homogeneous good to 1. The unit costs of k
and l are respectively r and w, where r and w are given. We distinguish
between formal and informal entrepreneurs. A formal entrepreneur pays an
ad valorem tax f. An informal entrepreneur cheats the system and pays no
taxes, but if detected is out of business. We assume that the probability of
detection p increases with the size of the ﬁrm and that p(k)¼ 0 if krk and
p(k)¼ 1 if kWk, that is, an informal entrepreneur cannot employ more
than k but is able to evade taxes.7
The proﬁt functions for an entrepreneur of ability yi who chooses to be
respectively informal or formal follow:
pIi ¼ max
li ;kik
fyikai lbi  rki  wlig
pFi ¼ max
li ;ki
fð1 fÞyikai lbi  rki  wlig ð1Þ
The maximization of Eq. (1) gives the optimal quantity of production
factors which are respectively used by an informal and a formal
entrepreneur, given her ability yi:
1
3
5
7
9
11
13
15
17
19
21
23
25
27
29
31
33
35
37
39
TOMMASO GABRIELI ET AL.106
kIi ¼ min y1=ð1abÞi
a
r
 ð1bÞ=ð1abÞ b
w
 b=ð1abÞ
; k
( )
;
lIi ¼ min y1=ð1abÞi
a
r
 a=ð1abÞ b
w
 ð1aÞ=ð1abÞ
;
byika
w
 1=ð1bÞ( )
,
kFi ¼ ðð1 fÞyiÞ1=ð1abÞ
a
r
 ð1bÞ=ð1abÞ b
w
 b=ð1abÞ
;
lFi ¼ ðð1 fÞyiÞ1=ð1abÞ
a
r
 a=ð1abÞ b
w
 ð1aÞ=1abÞ
When is it optimal for an entrepreneur to become formal? In choosing
whether to become formal or not micro-entrepreneurs trade-off the gains of
employing more than k with the cost of paying the tax f. On one hand,
formality decreases productivity as it decreases the marginal products of the
factors of production and such effect shows that informality can work as a
device to enhance ﬂexibility and productivity. On the other hand, formality
allows ﬁrms to grow bigger as it increases the production set. It is the extent
of the trade-off between the two effects that determines which entrepreneurs
ﬁnd it optimal to become formal rather than remaining informal.
As shown by Paula and Scheinkman (2007), the convexity of the proﬁt
functions Eq. (1) in y implies that there is a unique threshold level of ability
above which entrepreneurs become formal. The following proposition
formally establishes this result and ﬁnds an analytical expression for the
threshold level of ability. The proof is given in AU :4the appendix.
Proposition 1. There exists a threshold level of ability y such that an
entrepreneur i will decide to be formal if and only if her ability yi is greater
than y. y increases in f.
This result is driven by the fact that productivity increases in yi and
therefore agents with higher yi can afford to trade-off a decrease (measured by
f) in the marginal product of factors for an increase of the production set.8
Deﬁne an ability threshold y^ such the individual with ability y^ is
indifferent between becoming a salaried worker or an informal entrepre-
neur, hence w ¼ pI ðy^Þ. Plugging the ﬁrst-order conditions into Eq. (1) we
ﬁnd that y^ ¼ ð1 a bÞðaþb1Þðr=aÞað1=bÞb w1a. Therefore, we have that:
if yi  y^, then i is a salaried worker;
if yi 2 ðy^; y, then i is an informal entrepreneur;
if yi4y, then i is a formal entrepreneur.
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Effect of a Policy Change
If the salaried wage is ﬁxed,9 the fact that y increases in f (Proposition 1)
implies the following corollary.
Corollary 1. The greater the tax f, the greater the cut-off level of ability y
and the smaller the formal sector (and vice versa).
It is interesting to note that those who gain the most out of a reduction in
the cost of formalization from f to fu are the more able individuals. The
following proposition shows this result, and proof is relegated to the appen-
dix. As we will remark, this result is due to the convexity of the technology.
Proposition 2. The greater the individual ability yi is the greater is the
increase in the proﬁt p(yi) and revenue yi(yi) for a decrease in the tax rate
from f to fu.
We illustrate the results from the propositions above using diagrams.
Fig. 1 illustrates the informal entrepreneurs’ proﬁt function (thick line) and
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the formal entrepreneurs’ proﬁt and revenue function before and after a
reduction in the tax (thin and dashed lines). From the ﬁgure it is possible to
notice the results of Propositions 1 and 2.10 Moreover, from the ﬁgure, it is
also evident that the result of Proposition 2 would not apply to a different
model in which pF(fu) is not always convex for y4y
0
.11
The model can be extended to the case of a lump-sum tax. In this case,
the proﬁt function of a formal entrepreneur is the following: pFi ¼
max
li ;ki
fyi kai lbi  rki  wli  fg, where f now represents a lump-sum tax. In
such case all the previous conclusions still hold. Fig. 2 illustrates the proﬁt
function plot for this case of a lump-sum tax change.12
DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
We employ the Brazilian Survey of the Urban Informal Sector (Pesquisa
Economia Informal Urbana, ECINF) collected in October 1997 (11 months
after the introduction of the SIMPLES) by the Brazilian Statistical Institute
(IBGE, Instituto Brasileiro de Geograﬁa e Estadı´stica). This survey is a
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Line), Formal After Decrease in Tax (Dashed Line).
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cross-section representative of all the urban self-employed and micro-ﬁrm
owners with at most ﬁve paid employees, excluding domestic workers. The
stratiﬁed sampling design (in two stages) allows studying a population of
units which are rare, heterogeneous and hard to detect in standard
household surveys. Geographically, it covers all of the 26 Brazilian states,
as well as the federal district, and also each of the 10 metropolitan areas
(Bele´m, Fortaleza, Recife, Salvador, Belo Horizonte, Vito´ria, Rio de
Janeiro, Sa˜o Paulo, Curitiba, and Porto Alegre) and the municipality of
Goiaˆnia. In each of its two waves, ECINF interviewed roughly 50,000
households among which it found more than 40,000 individuals which
reported owning a micro-enterprise.
We analyze ﬁrms with a government issued license as our measure of
formality. Only 23.2% of all micro-ﬁrms have a license which increases to
31.1% for micro-ﬁrms with at least one paid employee.
Within the Brazilian micro-entrepreneur sector, the most frequent sectors
of activity are retail trade (26% of micro-ﬁrms) and personal services (20%),
followed by construction (15%), technical and professional services (11%)
and manufacturing (11%). Respectively 8% and 7% of micro-ﬁrms belong
to the sectors of hotels and restaurants, and transportation. Most ﬁrms are
very small both in terms of revenues and employment: the average and
median monthly revenues of Brazilian micro-ﬁrms were $US 1,083 and $US
600, respectively. We ﬁnd that 87% of all Brazilian micro-ﬁrms have no paid
employees, and 79% have no employees or partners at all, 10% of the
surveyed micro-ﬁrms have one or two paid employees, and only 3% have
between three and ﬁve paid workers. In those ﬁrms with at least one paid
employee, roughly 22% of all workers are family members, almost two-
thirds of paid workers are non-registered (sem carteira assinada) and only
35% pay social security contributions.
The ECINF asks whether respondents started their ﬁrms themselves or
became owners at a later date. The survey then collects data on the number
of years and months since respondents respectively started the ﬁrm or
became owners-partners. We use this information to construct our time-in-
business variable. For ﬁrms that were not started by their current owners,
our time-in-business variable reﬂects the time since the current owner joined
in as a partner, which is not necessarily the actual age of the ﬁrm. This
problem, however, affects only 8% of ﬁrms (92% of respondents report
having started their own ﬁrms) and it does not appear to have a signiﬁcant
impact on our main conclusions. Given that the IV strategy relies heavily on
the validity of this measure we will also consider separately the subsample of
micro-ﬁrms where the ﬁrm was started by the current owner.
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THE SIMPLES PROGRAM AND IDENTIFICATION
STRATEGY
In November 1996, the Brazilian government implemented a new
unanticipated simpliﬁed tax system for micro-ﬁrms and small ﬁrms, the
SIMPLES. The new national system consolidated several federal taxes and
social security contributions. Basically, the SIMPLES abridged procedures
for the veriﬁcation and payment of federal, state, and municipal taxes. At
the federal level, the system allowed eligible ﬁrms to combine six different
types of federal taxes and ﬁve different social security contributions into a
one single monthly payment, varying from 3% to 5% of gross revenues for
micro-enterprises, and from 5.4% to 7% of revenues for small ﬁrms. One
important aspect of the new system is that it allowed substituting a ﬁxed
(and relatively low) percentage of total invoicing for the standard payroll
contribution, which led to a substantial reduction in labor costs and hence
created a strong incentive to hire new employees and/or legalize already
existing labor relationships. The motivation behind these reductions in
direct and indirect taxes was to enable small, unskilled labor-intensive ﬁrms
to compete more effectively with larger enterprises, for which high tax
burdens are more manageable due to scale economies. Moreover, while
value added taxes collected at the state and municipal levels – the Imposto
Sobre Circulac- a˜o de Mercadorias e Prestac- a˜o de Servic-os (ICMS) and the
Imposto Sobre Servic-os (ISS) – were initially not included in SIMPLES,
states and municipalities could enter into agreements with the federal
government to transfer to the latter the collection of the corresponding taxes
through an increase in the SIMPLES rates. As a result, SIMPLES permitted
an overall reduction of up to eight percentage points in the tax burden faced
by eligible ﬁrms MonteiroAssuncao06. SIMPLES, however, explicitly
excluded from program eligibility all activities that by law require the
employment of professionals in regulated occupations. Examples of
ineligible activities include the manufacturing of chemical products,
machinery and equipment, as well as education, health, accounting,
insurance and ﬁnancial services, among others.13
Given the previous model, ﬁrms’ output or revenues yi ¼ yi kai lbi can be
re-expressed as a function of formality (which can be thought of as an
indicator variable with 0 and 1 and labeled with d), and entrepreneurial
ability yi:
yi ¼ f ðd i; yiÞ
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As the previous section showed formality affects output through the
quantity of capital as formal entrepreneurs can employ a quantity kiWk
.
Net of the effect of costs of formality f, an entrepreneur i would employ
kiWk
 if and only if yiWy
. Therefore, f ð1; yiÞ  f ð0; yiÞ40, yiWy (return
to formality) and @f ð; Þ=@yi ¼ kai lbi40 (return to ability).
As we have shown, there exists a cut-off value of ability, y, and ﬁrms with
ability above that threshold will select into formality. SIMPLES can be
conceived of as a reduction in the cost of formalization to f0of (albeit
across many margins: registration costs, labor costs, etc.) that will change
the cut-off value of ability from y to y
0
(Corollary 1). Firms that change their
formality status because of SIMPLES are those with y 2 ðy0; y. This also
implies that there will be a subset of ﬁrms who will not change their
formality status: some will remain formal (best entrepreneurs), others will
remain informal (worst entrepreneurs).
The introduction of SIMPLES by unanticipated administrative decree
can be seen as an exogenous policy change that signiﬁcantly altered the
incentives to become formal and hence is useful to solve the endogeneity
problem. The theoretical model developed above predicts that only for a
segment of ﬁrms we will be able to identify the effect of formality. The
reason is that we will only observe an effect of SIMPLES on those ﬁrms
with y 2 ðy0; y. This is the group of ﬁrms that have a large enough y such
that the SIMPLES tax reduction makes them to re-evaluate their formality
status, but not so large as to make the change in f irrelevant to their
formality decision. This segment contains ﬁrms that will become formal
only after the reduction in taxes, and therefore we can identify b1 by using
the regression discontinuity approach described above. Note that this does
not mean that for ﬁrms with yoy
0
or yoy formality has no effect on the
ﬁrm performance variable. Rather that we cannot identify the effect of
formality for those ﬁrms.
Monteiro and Assunc- a˜o (2006) argue that for relatively young ﬁrms (i.e.,
less than two years old) when the ﬁrm was started clearly differentiates ﬁrms
that beneﬁt from SIMPLES from those that did not. Although all ﬁrms
could beneﬁt from SIMPLES, ﬁrms born after SIMPLES show a much
higher propensity to have a license than those born before. Overall this
suggests a dual process for formalization: ﬁrst, a ﬁrm’s decision to formalize
is primarily taken at the time of its creation; second, the likelihood of
becoming formal increases with time-in-business.14 The ECINF provides
some evidence on this: only one out of four licensed business made no
attempt at regularizing at the time of starting up compared to 4 out of 5
non-licensed business. Thus, the decision of whether to operate formally or
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informally appears to be made in most cases at the time of start-up. This
could be due either to costly and/or complex registration procedures, to high
tax rates, or to a limited demand among very small businesses for the
government services or the expanded access to markets that are associated
with formality at any price. While the data do not allow us to distinguish
among these different two possible explanations, 72% of the ﬁrms that do
attempt to register report having no difﬁculties in the process.
Monteiro and Assunc- a˜o (2006) exploit the ﬁrst process, that is, the
differential effect on licensing caused by the introduction of SIMPLES for
ﬁrms born before and after it. Let AFTER be an indicator for whether a ﬁrm
was created before or after the SIMPLES was implemented (such that
AFTERi¼ 1 if ti  t and AFTERi¼ 0 otherwise, where ﬁrms that have been
in business for at most t months were created after SIMPLES) and ELIG an
indicator for the eligibility status of the ﬁrm. Monteiro and Assunc- a˜o (2006)
the interaction of eligible/non-eligible and before/after indicators, that is,
AFTERELIG as an IV difference-in-differences to measure the impact of
formality on ﬁrm performance AU :5.
Fig. 3 plots licensing rates for ﬁrms with different dates of creation (see
section ‘‘Data and Descriptive Statistics’’ for a description of the database
of micro-ﬁrms used). The ﬁrst two graphs plot separately eligibles and non-
eligibles for all ﬁrms; the last two take only the sample of entrepreneurs that
started as owners of the ﬁrm. The ﬁgures show that there is a signiﬁcant
jump in licensing rates for eligible ﬁrms, but no change for non-eligible
ﬁrms. Moreover, the jump is observed only for ﬁrms born about the time of
the introduction of SIMPLES. Then, as argued in Fajnzylber et al. (2011),
the validity of AFTERELIG as an IV for formality crucially depends
on comparing ﬁrms that were born just after and before than t, that is,
jti  tjo for e small enough.
The regression discontinuity literature (see Hahn et al., 2001; van der
Klaauw, 2002) argues that an unbiased estimate of the treatment impact can
be obtained by giving heavier weights to observations arbitrarily close to a
discontinuity. If, conditional on a set of exogenous covariates, we assume
very similar distributions of unobservable characteristics of ﬁrms born
immediately before and after SIMPLES implementation, the discontinuity
that the introduction of SIMPLES introduces in the factors determining
formality can be exploited to provide unbiased estimates of the local average
treatment effect of the program. Using this argument, Fajnzylber et al.
(2011) show that the regression coefﬁcient of AFTERELIG is dependent
on the weighting scheme. Following these authors we will implement a fuzzy
regression discontinuity design, where on a small enough interval about the
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introduction of SIMPLES, identiﬁcation can be achieved by comparing
ﬁrms born just before and just after the SIMPLES introduction.
The validity of the estimates of the effect of formality on revenues relies
on the validity of SIMPLES as an IV. In particular, if self-selection into
treatment occurred this would produce biased estimates, and the direction
of the bias would depend on the correlation between those that beneﬁt from
SIMPLES treatment and unobservables. The ﬁrst concern is that some ﬁrms
might have strategically delayed their creation after the introduction of
SIMPLES, thus changing the composition of ﬁrms before and after.
Monteiro and Assunc- a˜o (2006) show that SIMPLES did not produce any
change in the number of starting ﬁrms as compared to similar months before
(i.e., SIMPLES produced no ‘‘rush’’ to start a ﬁrm) and it only affected
formality of eligible ﬁrms. Moreover, Fajnzylber et al. (2011) compare ﬁrms
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Fig. 3. Average Licensing Rates by Month of Firm Creation. Note: Average
licensing rates by reported month of ﬁrm creation. Owners: Original owners of the
micro-ﬁrm.
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born before and after together with eligible and non-eligible ﬁrms on several
observable characteristics (education, age, gender, location) and ﬁnd that
there are no statistically signiﬁcant differences. While this still does not rule
out differences in unobservables, these characteristics are likely to be
correlated with unobservables, and therefore they provide indirect evidence
for the validity of SIMPLES as an IV. Finally, Monteiro and Assunc- a˜o
(2006) show that the SIMPLES effect is not due to seasonal effects (they
repeat their analysis one and two years later as if SIMPLES had been
introduced in November 1995 and 1994, respectively, and they found no
effect) which shows that there are no intrinsic differences between ﬁrms born
before and after about the November cut-off in other years.
The second concern is that SIMPLES might have changed the
composition of eligible and non-eligible ﬁrms.15 First, changes in AU :6market
conditions might produce that low-skilled entrepreneurs are pushed out by
new entrants and excluded from the survey (which is a retrospective survey,
taken one year after SIMPLES, see section ‘‘Data and Descriptive
Statistics’’). Although we cannot control for potential attrition bias and
sample selection, sectoral transition studies (see Fajnzylber, Maloney, &
Montes-Rojas, 2006; Maloney, 1999) suggests that micro-entrepreneurs will
remain within the micro-ﬁrm sector and will not become salaried workers or
unemployed, hence that the micro-entrepreneurs sector will not change its
overall composition. Second, ﬁrms might have strategically changed the
industry or sector to become eligible. However, given that the deﬁnition of
non-eligibility mostly applies to regulated and professional occupations, for
an entrepreneur to change from the non-eligible to the eligible sector would
require a substantial change in the goods or services offered, a possibility
which seems unlikely in the short run.16
To summarize, our identiﬁcation strategy allow us to estimate the effect of
formality on ﬁrm performance for ﬁrms with y 2 ðy0; y and born near the
introduction of SIMPLES, that is, jti  tjo for e small enough. This
strategy requires the use of both QR (to model y) and regression
discontinuity designs (to amplify the effect of SIMPLES at the time of its
introduction).
QUANTILE REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY
In order to ﬁnd the threshold values y
0
and y we will consider the single
dimensional conditional quantiles, indexed by t 2 ð0; 1Þ, of the ﬁrm’s
revenues, y,
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Qyðtjd;x; jti  tjoÞ ¼ b1ðtÞd i þ b2ðtÞti þ b3ðtÞxi (2)
where i denotes the ﬁrm, d is a binary formality indicator (licensing), t
denotes time-in-business and x is a set of exogenous covariates. If we assume
that for all y1  y2 there exists 0ot1  t2o1, then this conditional quantile
function can be used to ﬁnd t0 and t that match y
0
and y, respectively. With
the proposed identiﬁcation we can estimate b1(t) for 0ot
0
ot  to1. This
case was discussed by Chesher (2003) where he argued about ‘‘the possibility
of identiﬁcation of a structural derivative evaluated at some quantile
probabilities but not at others’’(p. 1411).
It should be emphasized that b1(t) measures the difference in revenues
due to the effect of licensing (i.e., being formal) and that the conditioning
on a small interval about the introduction of SIMPLES, that is, jti  tjo,
does not imply this effect occurred in a given interval in time. These
differences are the result of potentially multiple simultaneous effects, such
as hiring more labor, capital, access to credit, operating in a ﬁxed
location, etc.17 We only focus on the quantile heterogeneity in total
revenues.
As argued in the previous section we use z¼ (AFTERELIG) as a valid
instrument for d. This identiﬁcation condition is discussed in Monteiro and
Assunc- a˜o (2006) and Fajnzylber et al. (2011). The IVQR estimation method
may be viewed as an appropriate QR analog of the two-stage least squares
(2SLS) that makes use of a valid exclusion restriction. More formally, and
following Chernozhukov and Hansen (2006, 2008), from the availability of
an IV, z, we consider estimators deﬁned as:
b^1ðtÞ ¼ arg minb1kg^ðb1; tÞkA (3)
where g^ðb1; tÞ is obtained from
arg minb2;b3;g
XN
i¼1
oðjti  tjÞrtðyi  b1d i  b2ti  b3X i  gziÞ (4)
with o(  ) a weighting function that is monotonically decreasing in jti  tj,
rtðÞ the t-QR check function, kxkA ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
x0Ax
p
and A is a positive
deﬁnite matrix.18 Differently to IV least squares, however, it does not have
a ﬁrst stage.
The asymptotic properties of the estimator are described in Chernozhu-
kov and Hansen (2006, 2008). In particular asymptotic normality holds,
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ﬃﬃﬃ
n
p ðb^ðtÞ  bðtÞÞ!d Nð0; JðtÞ1SðtÞJðtÞ1Þ
where b ¼ ðb1;b2;b3Þ0, JðtÞ ¼ E½f ðtÞð0jd; t; x; zÞðt;X ; zÞðd; t;xÞ0 with ðtÞ ¼
yi  b1d i  b2ti  b3xi  gzi, f ðtÞðÞ the density function, and SðtÞ ¼
ðminðt; t0Þ  tt0ÞE½ðd; t; xÞðt;x; zÞ0.
We refer the reader to Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005, 2006) for a more
detailed discussion on the assumptions used for identiﬁcation and the
asymptotic results of the IVQR estimator. One important assumption for
identiﬁcation of the IVQR is rank invariance. This implies that, conditional
on all other variables, a common unobserved factor, such as unobserved
ability, determines the ranking in the outcome conditional distribution of a
given subject across treatment states.19 In our application, a ﬁrm considers a
binary formality variable, d 2 f0; 1g. The potential outcome under each level
is given by the ﬁrm’s earnings under the different licensing fyd ; d ¼ 0; 1g. We
assume that the potential revenue outcomes, conditional on X¼ (x,t), are
given by Eq. (2), Qyd ðUjd;x; tÞ ¼ b1ðUÞd þ b2ðUÞtþ b3ðUÞx, where rank
UBU(0,1) indexes the unobserved heterogeneity, U(0,1) denotes the
standard Uniform distribution, and Qyd ðUjd;x; tÞ is increasing in U. Thus,
the distribution of potential outcome yd is characterized by the quantile
functions Qyd ðUjd; x; tÞ. The rank variable U is assumed to be determined by
entrepreneurial ability and other unobserved factors that do not vary with d.
Moreover, in this model, the independence condition only requires that U is
independent of the instruments z, conditional on X. Finally, the rank
variable U (entrepreneurial ability) is assumed invariant to d, which ascribes
an important role to conditioning on covariates X. Having a rich set of
covariates makes rank invariance a more plausible approximation.
ECONOMETRIC RESULTS
Our main goal is the estimation of Eq. (2), that is, the conditional quantiles
of the logarithm of total revenues. In order to implement this we follow the
strategy described in section ‘‘The SIMPLES Program and Identiﬁcation
Strategy,’’ where AFTERELIG is used as an IV for having a license.20 We
increase the power of the instrument by interacting it with gender and age of
the entrepreneur. Moreover, we use the same weighting scheme as in
Fajnzylber et al. (2011) with oðjti  tjÞ ¼ f ð0; jti  tjÞ, where f(0,s) is the
normal density of a standard Gaussian random variable with mean 0 and
standard deviation s.
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Our measure of ﬁrm performance y is the logarithm of total monthly
revenues. Unfortunately, we cannot apply the same analysis to proﬁts,
because this would need additional instruments for both capital and labor,
which are endogenous and affected by SIMPLES. Moreover, there may be
measurement errors in the cost of capital and imputation of the owner’s
salary. These are potentially large in micro-ﬁrms surveys. Therefore, the
return to formality is the ultimate effect on revenues arising from several
channels: hiring both more labor and capital, higher productivity, more
business opportunities, access to credit, etc. This effect may also include
changes in the composition of clients as in Paula and Scheinkman (2007)
model. As additional control variables x we use the AFTER, ELIG, gender
(dummy for female), age and education of the entrepreneur (the latter as
categorical dummies, base category: no formal education), number of
members in the household, a set of dummy variables for the reasons to
become an entrepreneur, time-in-business (interacted with AFTER and as a
square polynomial), and dummy variables by industry and state.
Tables 1 and 2 present the 2SLS and IVQR estimates of the conditional
mean and quantiles (selected quantiles) of ﬁrm revenues for the selected
weighting scheme described above for all and for those entrepreneurs that
started as owners, respectively. Figs. 4 and 5 summarizes the effect of
licensing on ﬁrm revenues.
The ﬁgures show that the effect of licensing is not statistically signiﬁcant
for to0.10 and tW0.60 (tW0.50 for the sample of original owners). This
suggest that, in terms of the characterization proposed in this paper, y
0 ¼
0:10 and that therefore, 10% of the sample corresponds to the entrepreneurs
that did not beneﬁt from SIMPLES because they opted out of formality
even after the tax reduction. Moreover, y ¼ 0:50ð0:60Þ, and then the upper
50% (40%) of the sample were already considering that the cost of formality
was not very high. For these segments, we cannot identify the effect of
formality through the introduction of SIMPLES. Taking the complement of
those groups, we deﬁne the target population given by 0.10rtr0.50 or
0.10rtr0.60 depending on the sample. Note that for this group the effect is
roughly similar to the 2SLS estimate.
Note, however, that the point estimates being non-statistically signiﬁcant
does not imply that the instruments are not working and that the effect of
licensing cannot be identiﬁed. In fact, this cannot be a priori be
distinguished from it being statistically equal to zero. The lack of a ﬁrst
stage does not allow us to use the OLS techniques for evaluating the IV
performance. Therefore, we propose a new procedure based on the
Chernozhukov and Hansen (2006, 2008) estimator. If the identiﬁcation
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Table 1. Quantile Regression Discontinuity Analysis – All Micro-
Firms.
IV Least-
Squares
Regression
IV Quantile Regression
t¼ 0.1 t¼ 0.25 t¼ 0.5 t¼ 0.75 t¼ 0.9
License 3.40 2.03 3.48 1.90 4.92 2.60
(1.04) (1.09) (0.66) (0.49) (6.93) (4.15)
Female 0.546 0.676 0.292 0.587 0.474 0.538
(0.075) (0.162) (0.200) (0.100) (0.111) (0.120)
Age 0.0039 0.0021 0.021 0.016 0.018 0.030
(0.020) (0.0059) (0.006) (0.004) (0.015) (0.14)
Education categories (base: no formal education)
Primary inc. AU :10.334 0.195 0.425 0.672 0.988 1.24
(0.090) (0.253) (0.296) (0.136) (0.414) (0.16)
Primary comp. 0.411 0.135 0.555 0.918 1.19 1.52
(0.119) (0.388) (0.329) (0.49) (0.47) (0.37)
Secondary inc. 0.735 0.562 1.15 1.16 1.37 1.66
(0.111) (0.313) (0.36) (0.16) (0.46) (0.21)
Secondary comp. 0.591 0.632 0.633 1.21 1.39 1.90
(0.196) (0.306) (0.351) (0.17) (0.58) (0.23)
College inc. 0.573 0.717 0.764 1.41 1.75 2.08
(0.301) (0.492) (0.455) (0.47) (0.57) (0.50)
Reasons to become entrepreneur (base: did not ﬁnd a job)
Proﬁtable business 0.402 0.968 0.103 0.513 1.136 1.64
(0.287) (0.441) (0.614) (0.441) (0.454) (0.65)
Flexible hours 0.227 0.022 0.397 0.127 0.369 0.476
(0.132) (0.338) (0.496) (0.184) (0.386) (0.445)
Be independent 0.127 0.350 0.048 0.409 0.390 0.472
(0.165) (0.286) (0.268) (0.118) (0.165) (0.322)
Family tradition 0.230 0.526 0.030 0.494 0.334 0.689
(0.302) (1.225) (0.354) (0.214) (0.427) (1.304)
To help family income 0.204 0.469 0.152 0.171 0.023 0.029
(0.060) (0.211) (0.203) (0.110) (0.120) (0.156)
Accumulated experience 0.330 0.530 0.447 0.422 0.407 0.909
(0.151) (0.230) (0.244) (0.158) (0.519) (0.912)
Make good deal 0.090 0.070 0.061 0.409 0.558 0.395
(0.136) (0.470) (0.301) (0.153) (0.211) (0.405)
As a secondary job 0.558 1.013 0.886 0.380 0.968 0.768
(0.178) (0.413) (0.495) (0.338) (0.431) (0.353)
Note: 6,741 observations. Standard errors in parenthesis. Instrumental variables: AFTER
ELIG interacted with gender and age of the entrepreneur. See text for additional details.
Signiﬁcant at the 10% level; Signiﬁcant at the 5% level; Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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Table 2. Quantile Regression Discontinuity Analysis – Owners.
IV Least-
Squares
Regression
IV Quantile Regression
t¼ 0.1 t¼ 0.25 t¼ 0.5 t¼ 0.75 t¼ 0.9
License 3.23 4.97 3.37 1.87 5.00 2.98
(0.97) (1.61) (0.73) (0.82) (7.53) (2.65)
Female 0.549 0.034 0.317 0.577 0.482 0.421
(0.077) (0.382) (0.176) (0.095) (0.112) (0.135)
Age 0.0043 0.015 0.021 0.015 0.019 0.027
(0.019) (0.012) (0.006) (0.004) (0.017) (0.11)
Education categories (base: no formal education)
Primary inc. 0.294 0.364 0.291 0.606 0.968 1.17
(0.095) (0.686) (0.258) (0.164) (0.459) (0.20)
Primary comp. 0.391 0.058 0.480 0.863 1.17 1.37
(0.121) (0.772) (0.293) (0.157) (0.51) (0.32)
Secondary inc. 0.718 0.307 1.05 1.09 1.42 1.66
(0.111) (0.883) (0.30) (0.17) (0.52) (0.24)
Secondary comp. 0.553 0.014 0.570 1.14 1.36 1.74
(0.201) (1.054) (0.320) (0.18) (0.64) (0.24)
College inc. 0.647 0.487 0.728 1.52 1.88 2.04
(0.278) (1.013) (0.512) (0.45) (0.66) (0.37)
Reasons to become entrepreneur (base: did not ﬁnd a job)
Proﬁtable business 0.222 0.201 0.106 0.685 0.863 1.71
(0.300) (0.961) (0.747) (0.690) (0.742) (0.36)
Flexible hours 0.387 0.853 0.325 0.177 0.369 0.770
(0.140) (0.690) (0.400) (0.208) (0.366) (0.478)
Be independent 0.182 0.257 0.089 0.445 0.384 0.367
(0.146) (0.433) (0.258) (0.120) (0.158) (0.226)
Family tradition 0.172 0.618 0.189 0.688 0.486 1.00
(0.262) (1.257) (0.342) (0.255) (0.387) (0.496)
To help family income 0.224 0.104 0.208 0.210 0.062 0.063
(0.058) (0.301) (0.205) (0.113) (0.132) (0.174)
Accumulated experience 0.323 0.017 0.393 0.426 0.395 0.944
(0.148) (0.675) (0.246) (0.197) (0.555) (0.592)
Make good deal 0.084 0.452 0.050 0.448 0.526 0.370
(0.132) (0.437) (0.298) (0.193) (0.203) (0.193)
As a secondary job 0.657 1.58 1.03 0.478 1.00 0.569
(0.194) (0.64) (0.337) (0.311) (0.411) (0.228)
Note: 6,300 observations. Standard errors in parenthesis. Instrumental variables: AFTER
ELIG interacted with gender and age of the entrepreneur. See text for additional details.
Signiﬁcant at the 10% level; Signiﬁcant at the 5% level; Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
strategy using the IV works well, then g^ðb1; tÞ, based on Eq. (3), should have
a clear global minimum. If, however, the IV is not appropriate, it should not
have a clear minimum. We thus plot several graphs of ðg^ðtÞ;b1Þ for different
quantiles t and analyze them. Figs. 6 and 7 report these for both samples
and tA{0.10,0.25,0.50,0.75,0.90}. From the graphs it can be noted that only
for tA{0.25,0.50} the function is convex almost everywhere with a clear
minimum, but it is less so for the remaining quantiles. This implies that the
lack of signiﬁcance in b^1 is associated with an IV that does not satisfy the
Chernozhukov and Hansen (2006, 2008) identiﬁcation criterion.
The 2SLS point estimate is 3.40 (SE AU :71.04) for all ﬁrms and 3.23 (SE 0.97)
for the owners subsample. Note that the subsample of ﬁrms whose current
entrepreneur was the original owner has higher standard errors. These high
and rather imprecise estimates are similar in magnitude to those in Monteiro
and Assunc- a˜o (2006) and Fajnzylber et al. (2011). Moreover, although not
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Fig. 4. Quantile Regression, All Micro-Firms. Note: Plot for 2SLS and IVQR
estimates with their corresponding 95% conﬁdence intervals. y-axis contains the
coefﬁcient estimates and x-axis the quantiles. The dashed horizontal line is the 2SLS
estimate, and the dotted lines the corresponding conﬁdence interval. the solid line is
the IVQR estimate, and the shadow its corresponding conﬁdence interval.
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reported, similar point estimates are obtained in levels if we compute the
corresponding percentage increment. As a result the large log estimates
appear because of the fact that ﬁrms have in fact low levels of revenues.
Overall, they clearly point out that formality (licensing) has a positive effect
on ﬁrms’ revenues. In fact, these high positive effects are observed for all
quantiles, although as mentioned above the effect is statistically signiﬁcant
only for the target population.
To examine the heterogeneity associated with the IVQR estimates we
perform diagnosis tests using Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests.21 First, we test
the hypothesis of a zero constant coefﬁcient for the IVQR estimates across
quantiles, that is, we test the hypothesis that H0 : b1ðtÞ ¼ 0. In order to
implement the test, we estimate the model for tA[0.1,0.9], compute the
Wald statistic for each particular quantile and take the maximum over the
corresponding quantiles. The results for the test statistics are 27.83 and
21.74 for the all micro-ﬁrms and owners samples, respectively. These
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Fig. 5. Quantile Regression, Started Firm as Owner. Note: Plot for 2SLS and IVQR
estimates with their corresponding 95% conﬁdence intervals. y-axis contains the
coefﬁcient estimates and x-axis the quantiles. The dashed horizontal line is the 2SLS
estimate, and the dotted lines the corresponding conﬁdence interval. The solid line is
the IVQR estimate, and the shadow its corresponding conﬁdence interval.
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Fig. 6. Validity of the IV. Note: Plot of the function kg^k – all micro-ﬁrms. y-axis
contains the estimates of kg^k and x-axis b1. Selected quantiles t¼ {0.10, 0.25, 0.50,
0.75, 0.90}.
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Fig. 7. Validity of the IV. Note: Plot of the function kg^k – owners. y-axis contains
the estimates of kg^k and x-axis b1. Selected quantiles t¼ {0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.90}.
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results strongly reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level of signiﬁcance
(the critical values are: 12.69 at 1% level of signiﬁcance, 9.31 at 5% level of
signiﬁcance, and 7.63 at 10% level of signiﬁcance). Thus, there exists
strong evidence to reject the hypothesis of zero or negative impact of
licensing on log revenues.
Second, we test the hypothesis of a constant given effect of SIMPLES on
revenues, that is, H0 : b1ðtÞ ¼ b, where we set b as the 2SLS estimate. The
results for the tests statistics are 9.43 and 6.53 for all micro-ﬁrm and
owners samples respectively, such that we reject the null at 5% level of
signiﬁcance for the ﬁrst case. Thus, although the conﬁdence interval of the
IVQR contains the point estimate of 2SLS, for various intermediate
quantiles, the evidence suggests that the effect of SIMPLES on revenues is
heterogeneous. However, in the second sample the wide conﬁdence
intervals made the 2SLS estimate to remain inside the bands and we
cannot reject the null hypothesis.
Finally, we apply the latter test, H0 : b1ðtÞ ¼ b, only over the selected
quantiles where we have evidence of identiﬁcation of the parameters of
interest, that is, for tA[0.10,0.60] (tA[0.10,0.50] for the sample of original
owners).22 In this case, the results for the test statistics are 11.08 and 7.57 for
all micro-ﬁrms and owners subsamples, respectively, such that we reject the
null at 5% level of signiﬁcance for the ﬁrst case, and at 10% for the second
case. This shows that there is heterogeneity within the target group segment.
In fact, we observe that the effect is actually decreasing on t for this range.
This result contradicts that in Proposition 2 and could be due to the non-
convexities described in McKenzie and Woodruff (2006), where the return
to capital is higher for low-capital ﬁrms. Overall, this suggests that, over the
range of identiﬁed quantiles, the formality treatment has a bigger impact on
low quantiles than in high quantiles.
The study of the covariate effects is of independent interest too. The
negative coefﬁcient of female reﬂects the fact that women engage in less
proﬁtable activities, possibly due to household commitments or outright
gender discrimination.23 There is no clear pattern across quantiles, which
determines that the gender effect applies uniformly to all types of ﬁrms.
Education is non-monotonic for the conditional mean model and for low
quantiles. In those cases, incomplete secondary education has the highest
effect in both subsamples. However, education becomes monotonically
increasing for tZ0.5. This determines that for ﬁrms in the low conditional
quantiles, higher education is not necessarily associated with higher
revenues, but it is with outstanding ﬁrms. Finally, the reasons to become
entrepreneur show interesting variability across quantiles. Reasons such as
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‘‘Accumulated experience’’, ‘‘Be independent’’, ‘‘Make a good deal’’ and
‘‘Proﬁtable business’’ which may be associated with entrepreneurs with high
ability are larger for high quantiles, while reasons for low-ability
entrepreneurs (such as ‘‘To help family income’’) are larger for the low
quantiles.
We also implement the method of Frolich and Melly (2008) and Frandsen
(2008) for comparison reasons. This estimator differs in several aspects to
the one proposed here. First, it corresponds to a standard regression
discontinuity design and is not designed to be used in a difference-in-
differences fashion. In our setup we implement this estimator by comparing
only treated (born after SIMPLES) and non-treated (born before
SIMPLES) considering a discontinuity in age of the ﬁrm. Second, as a
nonparametric estimator, it posses difﬁculties with a large set of covariates.
Thus, we implement the estimator without covariates and then, following
Frolich and Melly (2008), we use an alternative parametric speciﬁcation
using the propensity score (Prob½ti  tjd;x; jti  tjo) as a unique
conditioning variable. Third, standard errors are available only for the
case without covariates, and therefore only point estimates are provided for
the case with covariates. Finally, the choice of bandwidth is always an
important concern in nonparametric and semiparametric estimation, and
estimates may have large variation depending on the bandwidth. We
therefore use three different choices of bandwidth.
We estimate the model using the subsample of all micro-ﬁrms.24 The
results for both estimators, with and without covariates, are presented in
Table 3. Regarding the case with no covariates, there are only a few
quantiles where the point estimates are statistically different from zero. The
point estimates for the bandwidths two and three are somehow similar to the
IVQR estimates, while those for a bandwidth of four are negative and are
not statistically different from zero, evidencing the sensitivity to the
bandwidth choice. When covariates are used through the propensity score,
the point estimates are reduced to 1.1 on average. These point estimates
provide additional evidence on formality having a positive effect on
revenues. As mentioned above, the lack of a measure of dispersion precludes
us to provide any inference on these estimates. Thus, we are not able to
statistically analyze the question posed in the paper regarding which ﬁrms
beneﬁt from the reduction in formality costs. However, given the large
standard errors for the IV estimates presented in Tables 1 and 2, in most
cases, these nonparametric estimates are included in the 95% conﬁdence
intervals of the estimates discussed above.
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CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The econometric results are summarized as follows. First, the results show
positive point estimates evidencing that formality has a positive effect on
revenues. Overall this conﬁrms the effect of formality on ﬁrm performance is
positive and suggests that formality gains are potentially large. From a
policy perspective this implies that improving institutions to increase
participation beneﬁts the micro-ﬁrm sector. Reducing the cost of formality
allows ﬁrms to approach the steady state size dictated by their intrinsic
entrepreneurial ability.
Second, the answer to the question ‘‘which ﬁrms beneﬁt from the tax
reduction and simpliﬁcation?’’ is given by the estimates from the empirical
exercise showing that the target population corresponds to t quantiles in
0.10rtr0.50 or 0.10rtr0.60 depending on the sample. This means that
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Table 3. Nonparametric Analysis Without and With Covariates – All
Micro-Firms.
Quantiles Without Covariates With Covariates
Band¼ 2 Band¼ 3 Band¼ 4 Band¼ 2 Band¼ 3 Band¼ 4
t¼ 0.1 5.586 3.832 3.011 1.194 1.281 1.281
(5.92) (3.74) (2.30) – – –
t¼ 0.2 4.500 3.832 2.606 1.099 1.099 1.099
(7.16) (3.70) (2.99) – – –
t¼ 0.3 4.605 3.817 2.548 1.066 0.971 1.012
(6.17) (5.16) (1.50) – – –
t¼ 0.4 4.700 4.209 2.534 1.130 1.003 1.099
(11.94) (3.83) (1.36) – – –
t¼ 0.5 4.423 4.081 2.485 1.110 1.110 1.099
(2.30) (3.89) (1.24) – – –
t¼ 0.6 4.423 4.159 2.659 1.099 1.012 1.107
(2.40) (4.27) (2.05) – – –
t¼ 0.7 4.423 4.338 3.079 1.163 1.163 1.163
(2.49) (4.65) (2.69) – – –
t¼ 0.8 4.423 4.232 3.344 1.139 1.139 1.281
(2.59) (3.48) (1.77) – – –
t¼ 0.9 4.605 4.232 2.784 1.124 1.046 1.225
(9.23) (3.47) (1.78) – – –
Note: 6,741 observations. Band¼Bandwidth. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Signiﬁcant at the asymptotic 10% level; Signiﬁcant at the asymptotic 5% level;
Signiﬁcant at the asymptotic 1% level.
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SIMPLES had a potential effect on 40–50% of the micro-entrepreneur
population, mostly concentrated on low-ability ﬁrms. Note that this
corresponds to beneﬁts in terms of changing formality status (i.e., becoming
formal) not on the overall effect of SIMPLES, because SIMPLES also had
beneﬁts for those already formal that would face lower taxes. The
theoretical model also shows that the larger is the tax reduction, the larger
will be the segment of ﬁrms that will change their formality status.
Third, for the target group where the effect of formality can be
identiﬁed, we ﬁnd evidence of heterogeneity across quantiles on the impact
of license on the conditional distribution of revenues. These estimates
suggest that reducing the cost of formality might signiﬁcantly beneﬁt low-
ability ﬁrms more. However, these effects can only be studied for the
quantiles where the effect of formality can be identiﬁed, and therefore, we
cannot offer a complete analysis of the heterogeneity in the effect of
formality on revenues.
NOTES
1. Re´gimen Simpliﬁcado para Pequen˜os Contribuyentes, see Gonza´lez (2006).
2. SARE stands for ‘‘Sistema de Apertura Ra´pida de Empresas.’’ It was
implemented in selected municipalities and consolidated in single local ofﬁces all
the federal, state, and municipal procedures needed to register a ﬁrm, reducing the
total duration of the process to at most 48 hours.
3. SIMPLES stands for ‘‘Sistema Integrado de Pagamento de Impostos e
Contribuc- o˜es as Microempresas e Empresas de Pequeno Porte.’’ See section ‘‘The
SIMPLES Program and Identiﬁcation Strategy’’ for a detailed description of the
program.
4. This is the deﬁnition adopted in Fajnzylber et al. (2009, 2011).
5. Ability is thus only relevant when managing a ﬁrm. Modeling the salaried
sector exceeds the scope of this paper.
6. The results of the model would still apply with any concave production
function.
7. The functional form of the probability of detection could be more general:
Paula and Scheinkman (2007) show that as long as p is an increasing function of k
there is still a threshold level of ability such that entrepreneurs go from informal to
formal and therefore the same conclusions hold.
8. As in Rauch (1991) and Paula and Scheinkman (2007, 2010) the weakly
monotonic relationship between exogenous ability and optimal level of formality is
implied by the standard assumption of convex technology. Non-convex proﬁt
functions could imply more than one crossing point; hence, a non-monotonic
relationship over a certain range of ability, but the relationship would still be
monotonic for high levels of ability if formality constraints the production set.
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Moreover, it could be an interesting avenue for future research to analyze the
possibility that ability is not exogenous but is affected by the formality/informality
decision, for instance by learning dynamics.
9. As the tax rate f changes, the equilibrium wage may in principle change.
Ceteris paribus, a decrease in the tax fosters a larger formal sector, but this effect
increases in turn the demand for labor. We abstract from the possibility of a change
in the salaried wage.
10. We use a¼ 0.2, b¼ 0.7, r¼ 3, w¼ 5. Then, it can be computed that k¼ 3.123
and y¼ 10. Fig. 1 shows the informal entrepreneurs’ proﬁt (thick line) and those of
formal entrepreneurs given f¼ 0.2 (thin line) and given fu¼ 0.1 (dashed line). It can
be computed that the threshold value of ability is y ¼ 16:1 for f¼ 0.2 and decreases
to y ¼ 13:2 for fu¼ 0.1.
11. These would be the case with the non-convexities described in McKenzie and
Woodruff (2006), where the return to capital is higher for low-capital ﬁrms.
12. Given values a¼ 0.2, b¼ 0.7, r¼ 3, w¼ 5, it can be computed that k¼ 3.123
and y¼ 10. Fig. 2 shows a plot of the informal entrepreneurs’ proﬁt (thick line) and
those of formal entrepreneurs given f¼ 500 (thin line) and given fu¼ 250 (dashed
line). It can be computed that the threshold value of ability is y ¼ 16 for f¼ 500 and
decreases to y ¼ 14:5 for fu¼ 250.
13. This corresponds to the indicator variable ELIG below.
14. See the analysis for micro-ﬁrms in Mexico and other evidence for Latin
American countries in Fajnzylber et al. (2009).
15. We thank Tiziano Razzolini and an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
16. A formal analysis of the choice non-eligible vs. eligible sector and of the
general equilibrium effects of a reduction in the cost of formality (see Note 9) goes
beyond the scope of the present paper.
17. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
18. As discussed in Chernozhukov and Hansen (2006), the exact form of A is
irrelevant when the model is exactly identiﬁed, but it is desirable to set A equal to the
asymptotic variance–covariance matrix of g^ðaðtÞ; tÞ otherwise.
19. Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005) show that it is possible to achieve
identiﬁcation with IVQR using a weaker assumption called rank similarity. Rank
similarity relaxes exact rank invariance by allowing unsystematic deviations,
‘‘slippages’’ in one’s rank away from some common level.
20. The implied ﬁrst-stage regression is Licensei¼ a1AFTERiþ a2ELIGiþ
a3(AFTERiELIGi)þ a4xiþ ei.
21. Kolmogorov–Smirnov test in QR are discussed in Chernozhukov and Hansen
(2006) and Koenker (2005).
22. In general the index used for Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests in QR is symmetric
of the form [e,1e]. However, in some situations it is desirable to restrict the interval
of estimation to a subinterval, as [t0,t1]A(0,1). As Koenker (2005) discusses, this can
be easily accommodated by using a renormalized statistic.
23. However, as argued by an anonymous referee, it is also the case that women
engage in less risky activities, and it is not necessarily the case that more risk is
optimal.
24. Similar results are obtained for the owners-only subsample. Results are
available from the authors upon request.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1
An entrepreneur with ability yi  y always ﬁnds optimal to be informal.
An entrepreneur with ability yiWy
 ﬁnds optimal to become formal if
and only if pFi  pIi . Plugging the ﬁrst-order conditions into Eq. (1) we
obtain that
pI ðyÞ ¼ ð1 a bÞyð1=ð1abÞÞ a
r
 a=ð1abÞ b
w
 b=ð1abÞ
and
pF ðyiÞ ¼ ð1 a bÞðð1 fÞyiÞ1=ð1abÞ a
r
 a=ð1abÞ b
w
 b=ð1abÞ
An entrepreneur with ability yiWy
 who decides to be informal
will choose capital k and labor lI ðk; yiÞ ¼ ðbyika=wÞð1=ð1bÞÞ. Deﬁning
gi 	 yi=y  1 we can re-express yi ¼ ð1þ giÞy and lI ðk; yiÞ ¼ ð1þ giÞl.
Plugging k and lI ðk; yiÞ into the expression for the proﬁt of a formal
entrepreneur we obtain that pI ðyiÞ ¼ ð1þ giÞ1=ð1bÞð1 a=ð1þ giÞ1=ð1bÞ  bÞ
yð1=ð1abÞÞða=rÞa=ð1abÞðb=wÞb=ð1abÞ.
Therefore, we obtain that pI ðyiÞ4pF ðyiÞ if and only if
ðð1þ giÞa=ðð1þbÞð1abÞÞÞ=ð1 ða=ðð1þ giÞ1=ð1bÞÞ  bÞo1=ðð1 a bÞ
ð1 fÞ1=ð1abÞÞ. The left-hand side
ð1þ giÞa=ð1þbÞð1abÞ
1 a=ð1þ giÞ1=ð1bÞ  b
(5)
of the inequality above increases in gi as the derivative of Eq. (5)
dðÞ=dgi ¼ ðað1 xÞ=ð1 a bÞÞxða=ð1bÞð1abÞÞ1Þ=D2, where D	deno-
minator of Eq. (5), x 	 ð1þ gÞð1=ð1bÞÞ and 0oxo1.
Deﬁne g such that the condition above is satisﬁed with equality. This
condition identiﬁes a threshold level of ability y ¼ ð1þ gÞy such that an
entrepreneur i decides to become formal if and only if yi4y.
Notice that the right-hand side of the inequality increases in f therefore g
and y increase in f. QED
1
3
5
7
9
11
13
15
17
19
21
23
25
27
29
31
33
35
37
39
TOMMASO GABRIELI ET AL.132
Proof of Proposition 2
The second cross-derivative d2pF ðÞ=dydf is negative. Therefore, the
difference ðpF ðf0Þ  pF ðfÞÞ, where f0of, increases in y. This proves the
proposition for formal entrepreneurs. pF ðf0Þ increases in y at a faster rate
than pF(f) as d2pF ðÞ=ðdyÞ2 is decreasing in f. The result of Proposition 1
(single crossing between pF and pI) implies that pF(f) increases at a faster
rate than pI for yoy. Therefore, it must be the case that pF ðf0Þ increases at a
faster rate than pI for y 2 ½y0; y, where y0 is the new cut-off level of ability
given fu. Therefore, this proves the proposition also for those entrepreneurs
that change their status from informal to formal as a result of the policy
change.
Plugging the ﬁrst-order conditions into the expression for output/
revenue yi ¼ yikai lbi we obtain that
yI ðyÞ ¼ yð1=ð1abÞÞ a
r
 a=ð1abÞ b
w
 b=ð1abÞ
and
yF ðyiÞ ¼ ðð1 fÞyiÞ1=ð1abÞ a
r
 a=ð1abÞ b
w
 b=ð1abÞ
represent respectively revenues for informal and formal entrepreneurs. It is
immediate to notice that the revenue functions behave exactly as the proﬁt
functions. QED.
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instances where it refers to this
chapter? Please check.
AU:3 Please check the text ‘‘The
authors would likey.’’ has been
13
5
7
9
11
13
15
17
19
21
23
25
27
29
31
33
35
37
39
placed under the heading
‘‘Acknowledgments.’’
AU:4 As per the style, the text of
propositions is given in roman.
Should we change accordingly,
please suggest. As of now we
have retained the author’s
version.
AU:5 Please check sentence
‘‘Monteiro and Assunc-ao (2006)
the interactiony’’ for clarity and
correctness.
AU:6 Please check the following
sentence: ‘‘First, changes in
market conditions might
producey’’ for clarity and
correctness.’’
AU:7 Please check ‘‘std. err.’’ has been
changed to ‘‘SE’’.
AU:8 City names have been inserted in
references ‘‘Frandsen (2008)’’
and ‘‘Frolich and Melly (2008).’’
Please conﬁrm.
AU:9 Please provide name of
institution and location in
references ‘‘Kaplan (2006)’’,
‘‘Paula and Scheinkman (2007)’’
and ‘‘Pereda-Fernandez (2010).’’
